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To be, or not to be: New Jersey’s Proposed Death With Dignity Act
By Rocco Seminerio

Whether or not, as Shakespeare wrote, it is nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles--should be ultimately
decided by the individual patient faced with a terminal illness. On one hand there are genuine
scenarios where patients with serious debilitating terminal illnesses should be legally permitted,
despite advances in palliative care, to request death-hastening drugs. On the other hand, although
the proposed New Jersey Death with Dignity bill would allow for that legal possibility, the
safeguards built into the draft of the bill introduced in 2013 are inadequate to address concerns
about undue influence, oversight, and competency. As a result, this paper proposes additional
mechanisms and fundamental changes in the safeguards in the oversight process before New
Jersey should endorse this well-intentioned but flawed bill. The paper proceeds as follows: a
general background on Death with Dignity Acts (DWDAs), followed by a discussion of the
constitutional status of the right to die, a discussion of the arguments for and against the bill and
proposed amendments, and then suggestions for minor changes. The paper concludes that, if
amended to include greater safeguards, the New Jersey legislature should enact the Death with
Dignity Act.
I. Background
By the year 2020, 2.5 million people aged 65 or older will die annually.1 Thanks to
advances in medicine and health care, in the past century the average life span has increased by
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Vicki Lachman, Assisted Suicide: Compassionate Liberation or Murder? 19(2) MEDSBURG NURSING 123 (March/April
2010).
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thirty years in the United States.2 The increase in the elderly population exacerbates a set of
pressing challenges for end of life health care not only to physicians, but affected family members
and society as well. Statistically there is a trend of increased cancer risk as people age, and it is no
surprise that older adults and the elderly have the highest rates of cancer.3 Therefore, larger
numbers of elderly persons and their families are facing a myriad of end-of-life healthcare
decisions. One of the more controversial possibilities at the end of life is that of physician-assisted
death or suicide. In the majority of states, including New Jersey,4 there are statutes which make it
a second degree criminal offense to assist others in suicide.5
Across the nation legislatures and citizens have been considering the question of physician
assisted death. There have been bills before the legislatures of Connecticut, New Hampshire
Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Kansas, and Massachusetts.6 So far however, the only states to pass
legislation allowing for physician-assisted death have been Oregon, Washington, and Vermont.7
Legalization of physician-assisted death began when the citizens of Oregon exercised their
democratic powers by voting in favor of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (DWDA).8 After the
Oregon DWDA was enacted in 1997, Vermont and Washington followed suit. DWDAs allow
someone who has been diagnosed with a terminal disease to request medication that will hasten
death.9 The state of Montana, although it has not formally enacted a DWDA, allows doctors to
offer an affirmative defense of consent in court should they be charged with assisted suicide,
2

James E. Dallner, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REV. 309, 310 (2004) citing U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, Ten Great Public Health Achievements - United States, 1900-1999, 48 Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Rep. 241 (1999).
3
See Cancer Incidence By Age, Cancer Research UK (July 26, 2012),
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/cancer-info/cancerstats/incidence/age/
4
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-6
5
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See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 847 (9 Cir. 1996) (Beezer, J., dissenting) ("In total,
forty-four states, the District of Columbia and two territories prohibit or condemn assisted suicide").
6
Death with Dignity Acts, Death with Dignity National Center (2012), http://www.deathwithdignity.org/acts
7
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8
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 § 2.01(1) (2005 & Supp. 2005).
9
Id.
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thanks to court precedent.10 On September 27, 2012, New Jersey Assemblyman Burzichelli
introduced a bill that would be the equivalent of the DWDAs in other jurisdictions.11 New Jersey
is therefore faced with an important decision.
Physician-assisted death has generated tremendous controversy nationwide. A 2007 poll
found that 71% of people thought that doctors should be allowed to legally assist a person hasten
death in the case of an incurable disease.12 This is slightly higher than a two-thirds majority in
favor of physician-assisted suicide found by a poll in 1991.13 In the context of a group consisting
of mostly health-care providers, a 2013 poll of New England Journal of Medicine readers revealed
that 67% opposed physician-assisted suicide.14 In yet another poll from 2012, 55% of Americans
supported physician assisted suicide and 45% opposed it.15
These polls reveal a country deeply divided on the question of physician-assisted death.
The main argument advanced in favor of physician-assisted death is the desire to give terminally ill
patients the control to end their lives on their own terms.16 The main argument against
physician-assisted death is fear of a slippery slope of abuse and the death of ill patients or members
of vulnerable populations who do not wish to end their lives.17 Moral and religious judgments also
factor into support or opposition to physician-assisted death. The various ancillary and counter
arguments for and against physician-assisted death are considered later.
10
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III. Is There A Right To Die? Constitutional and Policy Concerns
A. Washington v. Glucksberg
In the Supreme Court case of Washington v. Glucksberg, three terminally-ill patients
challenged the constitutionality of Washington statutes against assisting suicide.18 Five physicians
willing to aid patients in dying and an organization known as Compassion in Dying joined the
original plaintiffs.19 The District Court had held that there was a right to die for terminally ill
patients inherent in the Due Process Clause because of personal autonomy and dignity.20 The
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court decision.21
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority to reverse the lower courts, began his analysis
by noting that the nation’s history and legal traditions have criminalized assisting a suicide.22
Furthermore, he characterizes the prohibition on aiding suicide as a commitment to the protection
and preservation of all human life.23 Justice Rehnquist mentions that opposition and
condemnation of suicide as well as assisted suicide have been longstanding themes of our nation’s
philosophical, legal and cultural heritage.24 After discussing common law and history of the
attitudes towards suicide, Justice Rehnquist makes a very important point. He writes that, “…the
prohibitions against assisting suicide never contained exceptions for those who were near
death.”25 Death with dignity acts do exactly what has traditionally been excluded – they create
exemptions under assisted suicide laws for physicians in compliance with the DWDA.
Emphasizing the essential value of life, Rehnquist quotes Blackburn v. State: “the life of those to
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Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-708 (U.S. 1997).
Id.
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Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 706-707.
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Id. at 710 citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1990).
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Id.
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Id. at 714.
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whom life had become a burden—of those who were hopelessly diseased or fatally
wounded—nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, were under the protection of law,
equally as the lives of those who were in the full tide of life’s enjoyment, and anxious to continue
to live.”26
Justice Rehnquist then finally turns to the main issue that confronted the Court in
Washington v. Glucksberg, namely whether there is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause that covers a right to commit suicide and the right to assistance in doing so.27 Given the
history and legal traditions against suicide, the distinction between a refusal of unwanted medical
treatment and induced hastening of death, and a refusal to come to the “sweeping conclusion that
any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are…protected”, Justice Rehnquist
determined that there was no fundamental right at issue in the case.28
The last important take-away from the majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg is
Justice Rehnquist’s enumeration of state interests in banning physician-assisted suicide. Justice
Rehnquist’s list of state interests and Justice Souter’s enunciation of the state’s arguments in his
concurrence comprehensively encapsulate the anti-physician assisted suicide position. Justice
Rehnquist writes that a state has an interest in 1) preserving human life; 2) preventing suicide; 3)
protecting the integrity of the medical profession; 4) protecting vulnerable populations such as the
elderly and poor from undue influence or mistakes; and 5) preventing the popularization of
euthanasia as an outgrowth of allowing physician assisted suicide.29
In Justice Souter’s concurrence, he notes at least three additional state concerns and
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Id. at 715 citing Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872).
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Id.
Id. at 727.
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Id. See also Jennifer Bradford, Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg: Thou Shalt Not Kill, Unless Your State
Permits Physician-Assisted Suicide, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 121, 137 (1998).
28
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arguments. The state argued that 6) It is not always possible to say with certainty how long a
person may live; 7) the right to die could not be confined to the terminally ill, i.e. there is “no
principled basis on which the right can be limited to the prescription of medication for terminally
ill patients to administer to themselves when the right's justifying principle is as broad as merciful
termination of suffering”; 8) a person's competence cannot always be assessed with certainty.30
B. Vacco v. Quill
Decided together with Washington v. Glucksberg, the facts before the Court in Vacco v.
Quill were very similar to those in Glucksberg. Three mentally competent and terminally ill
patients dying from AIDS and cancer joined three physician plaintiffs who were willing to help
their patients end their lives but feared criminal prosecution.31 The plaintiffs claimed that they had
a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide and that the New York statutes criminalizing
such were unconstitutional.32 Judge Rehnquist again writing for the majority used the same
reasons he used in the Glucksberg case. He cited the nation’s legal history and traditions and stated
that New York had a rational basis to make the distinction between a refusal of unwanted medical
treatment and the induced hastening of death, or natural versus artificial death.33 The Supreme
Court thereby overruled the Second Circuit below, which reasoned from the In re Quinlan case
that the state’s interest in preserving life weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.34
Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion makes several interesting remarks. Justice Stevens
completely agrees with the Court that there is no categorical and fundamental right to commit
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Id. at 754-755.
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (U.S. 1997).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 803
34
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Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2 Cir. 1996) citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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suicide under the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Cause.35 Justice Stevens reasons
from Washington’s authorization of the death penalty that it has concluded that the sanctity of life
does not require that life always must be preserved.36 Furthermore, Stevens acknowledges that
there are situations in which an interest in hastening death is legitimate.37 He not only suggests
that such an interest is legitimate, but says that he is “convinced” that there are times when it is
entitled to constitutional protection.38
But Justice Stevens goes yet even further. Stevens wrote that the Cruzan case demonstrated
that some state intrusions on the right to decide how death will be encountered are intolerable.39
He invokes the Casey case’s discussion of the “outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty”,
which “definitely includes” protection for matters “central to personal dignity and autonomy.”40As
is often pointed out by disability-advocate groups, Justice Stevens notes that many terminally ill
people find their lives meaningful even despite pain or lack of independence.41 However, this is
not the case in every scenario. Stevens wrote that in general the State’s interest in a person’s
contribution to society and in preserving life triumphs, but this interest does not have equal force
when applied to terminally ill patients who are “faced not with the choice of whether to live, only
how to die.”42 Stevens characterizes this as a “critical threshold” of death.43
In part three of his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens writes that allowing the individual
instead of the State to make judgments “about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may
enjoy” does not imply that therefore the lives of the terminally-ill or disabled people have less
35

Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (U.S. 1992).
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Id.
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value than lives of those who are in good health.44 To the contrary, Stevens writes that it gives
recognition to the individual’s interest in choosing how to end life, as opposed to an end which
“demeans her values and poisons memories of her.”45
C. Glucksberg & Quill: The Bottom Line, Democracy& New Jersey’s Choice
The Supreme Court in both the Glucksberg and Quill cases confirmed that there is no
“fundamental” right to die inherent in the liberty protected by the Due Process clause. We see the
concerns of the state in finding a right to die enumerated by Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter.
But we also see from Justice Steven’s concurrence in Quill that there is a possibility that on a
particularized set of facts, statutes prohibiting physician assisted suicide may be constitutionally
impermissible because of the individual’s intimate liberty interest in how she will meet death.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not find a fundamental right to die, the States
were given a green light on enacting their own physician-assisted death legislation. The closing
remarks of Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg promote the continued debate over the “morality,
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.”46 Justice Rehnquist states that the Court’s
holding permits the aforementioned debate to continue, “as it should in a democratic society.”47
In a similar vein, the Montana Supreme Court determined in 2010 that physician-assisted
suicide did not violate Montana’s public policy.48 Although a rigorous dissenter in that case and
opposed to the holding, Justice Rice concluded that the court “should allow the public debate to
continue, and allow the citizens of this State to control their own destiny on the issue.”49

44

Id. citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282.
Id.
46
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
47
Id.
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Baxter, 224 P.3d at P50.
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New Jersey’s “destiny on the issue” is now at hand. A recent 2012 poll reports that among
a sample of New Jersey voters, 46% support the proposed DWDA while 38% oppose it.50 The
following section advances why New Jersey should pass the bill conditioned on several proposed
amendments.
IV. Affording the Legal Right to Die: Reasons in Favor
A. Self-determination, Autonomy, & Treatment with Dignity
Autonomy comprises "...the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."51 As Justice Stevens observed in his Quill concurrence, autonomy is part of
an individual’s right to liberty protected by the constitution. Because matters at the end of life
involve “the intimate and personal choices” a person can make in their lifetime, which therefore
implicate personal autonomy and dignity, these choices are “central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”52 Justice Stevens left open the door for the possibility of an assisted
suicide ban being unconstitutional as applied to particular facts. Even though a blanket
fundamental right to die does not apply to all situations, New Jersey should as a matter of policy
favor the legality of physician-assisted death in order to respect individual autonomy. If you ask
the terminally ill themselves, at least one study of 988 participants indicates that 60% support the
legal option of physician-assisted death and 10% were seriously pursuing that option.53
In a concurring opinion in Baxter v. Montana, Justice Nelson quoted a previous court case
which held that “respect for the dignity of each individual … demands that people have for
themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions
50

Matt Friedman, Poll: N.J. Voters Support Controversial Bill Allowing Doctor-Assisted Suicide, The Star Ledger (Dec.
4, 2012), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/12/poll_nj_voters_support_controv.html.
51
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (U.S. 1977).
52
th
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 848 (9 Cir. 1996) citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2807 (U.S. 1992).
53
Emanuel EJ, Fairclough DL, Emanuel LL: Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, 284 JAMA 2460-8 (2000).
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about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general…”54 If we
refuse to respect such a right, we are in danger of implementing “treatment which is
paternalistic—treating adults like children incapable of making autonomous choices for
themselves, or by trivializing what choices they do make about how to live their lives.”55
Inherent in democratic ideals is respect for the autonomy of the individual person to decide
for herself what is best. Justice Nelson in Baxter goes on to cite a law review article wherein its
authors explain that, “The only reasonable political compromise we can reach in modern
times…when we must accept as fact that different segments of society will have deeply
conflicting…views about how one ought to live one’s life, is to agree to treat each other…with
mutual respect and tolerance.”56 Furthermore, it is noted that this compromise of mutual respect
and tolerance make a modern constitutional democracy possible by respecting autonomous
liberty.57 The authors conclude that we must “focus on honoring the worth of autonomous
individuals. To remain consistent…the right to treatment with dignity must not be defined
according to some parochial, sectarian religious or some controversial, philosophical notion of
human dignity—those richer conceptions of dignity about which we have agreed to disagree.”58
DWDAs have so far only allowed competent59 adults to exercise the option of
physician-assisted death.60 It is therefore understandable that one might argue that DWDAs are
discriminatory, because while they allow competent terminally ill patients to end their lives, they

54

Baxter, 224 P.3d at P65 citing Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, P30 (Mont. 1999).
Id. citing Matthew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana
Constitution’s “Dignity” Clause with Possible Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (2000).
56
Id. citing Clifford and Huff, 61 MONT. L. REV. at 326-27.
57
Id.
58
Id. citing Clifford and Huff, 61 MONT. L. REV. at 326-27.
59
“Capable” is used in lieu of competency in the bill. Capable means “means having the capacity to make health
care decisions and to communicate them to a health care professional, including communication through persons
familiar with the patient’s manner of communicating if those persons are available.” Sect. 3 of N.J. Assemb., No.
3328 (2012).
60
See section 4 of N.J. Assemb., No. 3328 (2012).
55
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prohibit advance planning for assisted suicide given incompetency or surrogate decision-making
more generally. The difficulty with this objection however is that one of the fundamental grounds
for allowing physician-assisted death – self-determinative autonomy – is undermined if a patient is
not competent. In a famous New Jersey case, Judge Handler concurring and dissenting in part,
notes that incompetent persons have been “deprived by nature” of the right to personal choice.61
Judge Handler suggests that it “would be amiss” to stress notions of individual privacy or
autonomy and that such cannot enhance the ability to make life or death decisions in the context of
an incompetent patient’s best interests.62 If we were to afford the right of surrogates or guardians
to administer death-hastening drugs to their wards, we would be undermining the fundamental
ground of self-determination and autonomy justification for physician-assisted death in the first
place. Although guardians are said to be acting on “behalf” of their ward, the ward is certainly not
personally acting out of self-determination. Instead, as Judge Handler points out, surrogates are
acting for the best interests of the ward. Autonomy and self-determination are therefore no longer
relevant. None of this should suggest, however, that the determination of whether or not someone
is competent or ‘capable’ is an insignificant concern. To the contrary, it certainly is and will be
addressed below. Respect for competent patient autonomy and choice is the strongest reason for
passing the proposed New Jersey DWDA.
B. Illegal Practice& Violent Suicide
Underground practice of physician assisted suicide and suicide by other means are
problems particularly in jurisdictions where there is no legal procedure to hasten death. Before the
passage of the Washington DWDA, a study was conducted of physicians in Washington State.
When asked whether they had been requested to assist a suicide on terminally ill patients, 218 out

61

In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 392 (N.J. 1985) citing In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 274 (N.J. 1981) (Handler, J. concurring).
Id.

62
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of 828 doctors who responded answered in the affirmative.63 Furthermore, forty-three of those
doctors actually complied.64 We are therefore faced with some pressing questions. First, will
legalization of physician-assisted death help regulate the practice? At least two authors think that
legalization will fail to successfully regulate physician assisted death. The authors reason that if
doctors are ignoring the existing prohibitions against physician-assisted death in anti-suicide or
assisted suicide statutes, then why would they obey new regulations on the practice? 65 We are
dealing with several groups of doctors—those who would perform PAD regardless of its legality,
those who would not even if it became legal, and those who would only perform PAD if it was
legal. For the latter group, we may assume for our present purposes that they would be likely to
comply with new regulation. In the aforementioned study of Washington physicians, out of the
218 doctors who received a request, 26 cited that they refused for fear of the legal consequences.66
We are not concerned with the group of doctors who would never perform physician-assisted
death for moral or personal reasons.
But what about physicians who have been operating “underground” despite illegality and
have provided the means for a patient to die—won’t they ignore the law as they have in the past? I
think the answer is largely no. As noted previously, a majority of physicians are against
physician-assisted suicide. But those who support it often do so for moral reasons. Physicians who
risk being prosecuted by assisting someone with dying probably feel a moral obligation that they
believe justifies the risk of breaking the law. Instead of having a broad prohibition on
physician-assisted death, DWDAs would allow those previously underground practitioners to

63

Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and
Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919 (1996).
64
Id.
65
Daniel Callahan, Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin
Village, 30 U. RICH L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
66
Back, supra.missing info
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comply legally and still, in most cases, do what they believe is right in assenting to a patient’s
request.
Studies suggest that suicide risk is about double for cancer patients than it is for the general
population.67 There have been numerous and sad individual reports of suicide.6869 There are also
reports of individuals attempting suicide, but failing.70 Not much needs to be said here save that
some sort of legal framework wherein a terminally ill patient could request death-hastening drugs
would be preferable to patients finding ways on their own out of desperation. We should legalize
and regulate physician-assisted death to provide a proper channel for those who have a desire to
end their lives when they have a terminal illness.
V. The Good, the Bad, & the Ugly: Arguments Against the NJ Death With Dignity Act
A. The Slippery Slope, Vulnerable Populations, & Undue Influence
One of the most common objections to DWDAs is a fear that if physician assisted death is
legalized, it might lead to “the acceptance of the physician assisted suicide for the chronically ill,
the disabled, and the psychologically distressed, as well as to the acceptance of active
euthanasia…”71Of specific concern is the fear that particularly vulnerable persons of society will
be unwilling or unduly influenced victims of the slippery slope. Economic worries and high

67

William Breitbart, Suicide Risk and Pain in Cancer and AIDS Patients,
http://www.painresearch.utah.edu/cancerpain/ch04.html citing Fox BH, Stanek EJ, Boyd SC, Flannery JT., Suicide
Rates Among Cancer Patients in Connecticut, 35 J CHRONIC DIS 85-100 (1982) & Louhivuori KA, Hakama J., Risk of
Suicide Among Cancer Patients, 109 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL 59-65 (1979).
68
Plymouth Herald, Terminally Ill Man Bought Drug and Suicide Manual Online Before Killing Himself, (Sept. 13,
2013),
http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/Terminally-ill-man-bought-drug-suicide-manual/story-16892007-detail/story.ht
ml.
69
Delores Lewis, New Jersey: Pass the Death with Dignity Act for Terminally Ill Patients,
http://www.change.org/petitions/new-jersey-pass-the-death-with-dignity-act-for-terminally-ill-patients.
70
Cathleen F. Crowley, Life Interrupts An Attempt to Die at Home, (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Life-interrupts-an-attempt-to-die-at-home-2188158.php
71
Monika Ardelt, Physician-Assisted Death, C.D. Bryant et al. (eds.): Handbook of Death and Dying, Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage 424, 426 (2003) citing Mike Brogden, Geronticide: Killing the Elderly, Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley
(2001).
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medical costs contribute to the pressure to end life.72 It is perceived that “support for euthanasia
derives from an attitude of excessive preoccupation with efficiency...which sees the growing
number of elderly and disabled people as intolerable and too burdensome."73 The New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law in its 1994 report writes,
“The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose autonomy and
well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced
age, or members hip in a stigmatized social group. The risk of legalizing assisted suicide…in a
health care system and society that cannot effectively protect against the impact of inadequate
resources…and social disadvantages, would be extraordinary.”74
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Yet there is little evidence from
which these fears could infer valid justification. In a 2007 study of Oregon and the Netherlands, it
was concluded that there is no evidence of disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups.75
Analyzing the data from the Oregon Reports and three independent studies, the data yielded no
disproportionate impact among the “elderly, women, the uninsured, people with low educational
status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with psychiatric illnesses
including depression, or racial or ethnic minorities…” relative to the background populations.76
The only group that was disproportionately represented was those with AIDS.77
Even more so, evidence from Washington and Oregon show that not many people choose
to request death-hastening drugs, let alone ingest them. In Washington between March 2009 and

72

Andrew R. Page, What's the Cost of Living in Oregon These Days? - A Fresh Look at the Need for Judicial
Protections in the Death with Dignity Act, 22 REGENT U.L. REV. 233, 237 (2010).
73
John F. Coverdale, The Legacy of John Paul II to Lawyers, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) citing John Paul II,
Evangelium Vitae, p. 64 (1995).
74
Callahan & White, supra at 43 citing The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context, 120 (1994).
75
Margaret P. Battlin, Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence Concerning the
Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33(10) J. MED. ETHICS 591-597 (2007).
76
Id.
77
Id.
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December 2011 a total of 114 patients inquired into the DWD program.78 Of those 114, only 40
participants chose to pursue the program after counseling and upon request.79 Of those 40 who
received the death-hastening drugs, only 24 chose to ingest.80 Recipients typically were white,
male, and well educated.81 Similarly, in Oregon for 2012 only 115 patients requested and received
the drugs, and 77 chose to ingest.82
Trice Loggers, the lead researcher of the Washington study reports that, “Each year, there
are over 50,000 deaths in Washington state...The number who chose to participate in the DWD
program is miniscule. This study shows that people are not making these decisions lightly.”83
Furthermore, the Oregon Report reveals that the reasons for choosing physician-assisted death are
“loss of autonomy” (93% of participants), “decreasing ability to participate in activities that made
life enjoyable” (92.2%), and “loss of dignity” (77.9%).84In another study the authors concluded
that patients engaged in “PAS after a deliberative and thoughtful process.”85 Only 38% overall of
patients who died from ingesting death-hastening drugs reported that burden on family, friends or
caregivers were among their concerns.86 A paltry 2.7% of patients who died from ingesting drugs
reported that financial implications of treatment were among their concerns.87 These statistics do
not completely alleviate concerns of undue influence. Human motivation is complex after all, and
78

Elizabeth Trice Loggers, Implementing a Death with Dignity Program at a Comprehensive Cancer Center, 368 N
ENGL J MED 1417-1424 (2013).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Oregon Public Health Division, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act—2012, (2013),
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/
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it is possible for family members and close friends to subtly influence a patient. The bill does
provide that there are criminal penalties for willfully altering or forging “a request for medication
… or conceals or destroys a rescission…with the intent or effect of causing the patient's death…”88
Nonetheless, chances of detection in the normal course of things are probably slim given the
current supervision system. One author suggests that we have the courts handle these drug requests
because of their experience in handling issues involving undue influence as is the case with
contracts and wills.89 Ultimately this is a risk that we will have to take if we wish to legalize
physician-assisted death. Respect for autonomy does potentially mean that some people will
choose to die for other reasons than wanting to have control over his or her death.
Looking at the data, there does not seem to be explosive use of the DWDAs. The slippery
slope argument in the context of vulnerable groups does not seem terribly strong given the
statistics. Nonetheless, the distribution of drugs intended to induce death or drugs that can induce
such a death-hastening effect need to be monitored. One of the many things that need to be
addressed before endorsement of this bill by New Jersey citizens is the laying out of how the
Division of Consumer Affairs will monitor the prescription of death-hastening drugs more
carefully than is provided in the bill.90
B. Uncertainty in Prognosis of a Terminal Illness
One of the state’s concerns mentioned by Justice Souter in his Washington v. Glucksberg
concurrence is that it’s not possible to say with certainty how long a person may live. 91 Under
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section 3 of the New Jersey Bill, a terminal illness or disease is defined as “an incurable and
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical
judgment, result in a patient’s death within six months.”92 Among the arguments against
physician-assisted death, uncertainly in prognosis is one of the stronger ones. In a 1999 study
of Oregon Physicians, it was found that 27% of physicians who received requests from patients
for physician-assisted death were not confident that they could predict that the patient had a life
expectancy of less than six months. 93 Studies suggest that physician predictions of life
expectancy are “generally inaccurate.”9495 The Oregon Report from 2004 shows that some
people who were diagnosed with a terminal illness lived far beyond six months. 96
Outside of DWDAs, the six month prognosis model is already being used as a
qualification requirement for hospice care pursuant to Medicare regulations. 97 The
implementation of the six month standard in hospice care has been heavily criticized; some
have gone as far as to call the standard “meaningless.” 98 The six month standard for hospice
care is identical to the standard in DWDAs, thus generating the same difficulties. One study
showed that approximately ten percent of patients who satisfied the six month standard and
were admitted to hospices were eventually discharged because of remission or misdiagnosis. 99
Another study involving patients in Chicago hospice programs concluded that doctors got the

92

N.J. Assemb., No. 3328 (2012).
Monika Ardelt, supra citing Linda Gazini, Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences With End-of-Life
Care Since Passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 285(18) JAMA 2363-69 (2001).
94
Callahan & White, supra citing Robert A. Pearlman, Inaccurate Predictions of Life Expectancy, 148 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 2537 (1988).
95
Nicholas A Christakis, Extent and Determinants of Error in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients:
Prospective Cohort Study, 320 BMJ 469 (2000).
96
Sixth Annual Report on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, Department of Human Services (2004).
97
Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Regulating Death: Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act and the Legalization of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J. 725, 732 (1998).
98
Id.
99
Id. citing D. Allan Shewmon, Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora’s Box, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 219, 223
(1987).
93

17

prognosis right only about twenty percent of the time, and sixty-three percent of the time
overestimated their patients’ survival. 100 The lack of a certain or near-precise scientific basis
for determining when a patient is going to die is a source of great difficulty for prognosis
standards of terminal illness.
It is therefore conceivable that a patient might ingest death-hastening drugs long before
he or she would die from their illness or condition. Occurrences like these pose serious
concerns. Given the inability of a physician to determine exactly when a patient will die,
language in the bill requires that a physician must confirm the prognosis “within reasonable
medical judgment.”101 According to one right to die newsletter, the six month standard “…not
only calls on doctors to make an unreliable prediction, but prescribes a pointless time limit.” 102
Given the six month prognosis standard, there seems to be no remedy for these calculative
difficulties. Diagnosis is one thing, prognosis altogether another. One suggestion is to require
that physicians “extensively document a patient’s disease” and prognosis to serve as tangible
evidence requirements. 103 Documentation of the attending physician’s diagnosis and
prognosis are already required to be on the patient’s medical record pursuant to 11(c)(2) of the
proposed bill.104 While requiring additional documentation would provide grounds for a
lawsuit against a doctor if said documentation was inadequate, it is nonetheless impractical for
doctors and does nothing to remedy the difficulties inherent in predicting the course of a
disease.
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A sounder alternative would be to change the prognosis standard to one that would
better serve patients. The purpose of the terminal illness safeguard is to ensure that the patient
is already dying before considering any life-ending decisions.105 To achieve the aims of this
safeguard, the terminal illness standard for the proposed DWDA should be amended to: 1)
whether the diagnosed disease or condition has no known cure and there is no way to stop
progression of the disease, 2) whether the overall nature of symptoms is becoming
progressively worse, and 3) the nature of the disease is such that it will lead to death. These
considerations eliminate the need for physicians to hopelessly attempt to predict the schedule
of death. Such a multi-pronged standard also allows people with progressive diseases like
Alzheimer’s or ALS to request death-hastening drugs. Nonetheless, the requirement of
capacity still stands and will in effect bar those who suffer from advanced stages of certain
diseases which affect the brain and thus capacity from acquiring death-hastening drugs.
C. Determination of Capability
In Justice Souter’s Glucksberg concurrence he notes that the state argued that there are
difficulties with assessing the competence or capability of a patient. Grave concerns loom here
because they strike at the very heart of the justification for physician assisted death – autonomy
and self-determination. Physicians often are not confident in their ability to assess the
competence or capability of patients. 106 Nonetheless, guidelines do exist for determining
competency in the context of health-care decisions. In fact, our courts are generally the best
judges (literally) as to competency in questionable cases simply because they have experience
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in competency determinations in a number of different settings. 107 In scenarios where there is
ambiguous evidence or where competency is questionable, physicians should resort to New
Jersey General Equity & Chancery courts for guidance. The NJ DWDA should be amended to
require court determination of competency in cases where there are objections by family
members as to the patient’s competency. Court determinations should be permissible, but not
mandatory under the bill, when the two physicians seek more assurance in a situation of which
they are unsure.
For most capacity determinations however, going to court should be unnecessary. The
proposed NJ bill delegates capacity determinations to physicians. Pursuant to the bill, a
capacity determination must be within the physician’s “reasonable medical judgment.”108 The
requirement of capacity is motivated by a balance between respect for patient autonomy and
protecting a patient from the consequences of a poor decision. 109 When making an assessment
of competency, a physician “should attempt to strike the same balance that would result if a
court in the jurisdiction decided the case.” 110 When assessing capacity there is generally a
presumption that the person is capable and evidence of inability to form reasoned decisions is
required before a physician can determine that a patient is incompetent. 111
Typically, physicians do not have the knowledge or training required for adequate
patient competency determination. Physicians often are simply unaware that the patient lacks
capacity. 112 Physicians often fail to consider all relevant factors when they do attempt to make
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a capacity determination. 113 Some of these factors include the ability to communicate a choice,
understand the relevant information, appreciate the consequences of actions, and reason about
treatment options.114 Therefore, if the vital safeguard of competency is to function properly,
physicians counseling patients about the possibility of ending their lives must know what to
look for in the context of competency. Therefore to achieve this goal the NJ proposed DWD
bill should require that a physician receive training in assessing competency in order to
prescribe death-hastening drugs. In scenarios where even with training the physicians are
unsure, they should be permitted, but not required to go to a court of General Equity for
guidance.
E. Depression, Psychological Disorders, and Capacity
Deteriorating mental ability is not the only concern with respect to competency.
Depression or other psychological disorders like bipolar disorder further complicate the issue
as such conditions can invalidate decision-making by impairing a patient’s rational judgment.
Clinical depression or commitment to a mental institution is not dispositive in determining
incapacity.115 Neither the “principle of autonomy nor its legal manifestation, the doctrine of
informed consent, are automatically abrogated or trumped…solely because s[he] has been
categorized by health care professionals with the diagnostic label of clinical depression.” 116
Clinical depression is often linked to suicide. 117 However, general studies on
“traditional” suicide and mental disorders may not be fully applicable in the context of
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DWD.118In fact, one study found that a mere 12% out of a sample of 92 clinically depressed
participants scored in the “impaired” range using competency factors.119 It would be a grave
mistake, therefore, to attribute impaired judgment simply by virtue of a mental illness or
clinical depression. Instead, the focus should be on the factors that relate to capacity and
whether the patient is capable of understanding their situation and is able to reason about
consequences. The physician who is making a competency determination in the context of a
patient with a mental disorder or clinical depression must not let the request the patient is
making influence the conclusion of the evaluation; instead, the physician should focus on the
process involved in making the decision to request death-hastening drugs.120 Evaluators of
competency must be careful not to let their own values cloud their judgment in determining
whether or not a patient is actually competent or not. 121 The decision to request
death-hastening drugs coupled with a mental disorder or depression may suggest that an
evaluation should be performed, but the choice by itself cannot provide a basis to conclude that
the patient is not competent. 122 This aside, even patients themselves often have “second
thoughts” about physician-assisted death.123 Many, as is evident from the Oregon Reports, do
not ingest the death hastening drugs even after acquiring them. Physician training in assessing
competency as required by an amended version of the bill should increase the chance of
recognizing the signs of impaired decision making. Mental disorders or clinical depression
serve as red flags and physicians should be especially careful about writing prescriptions in
these scenarios. Requiring anti-depressant medications or additional psychological
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examination should not be mandatory under the bill. If a physician is uncertain, he or she may
suggest psychiatric expert evaluation or anti-depressant medication contingent on a patient’s
willing cooperation. A physician does not need to grant a patient’s request and is not compelled
to participate in the DWD program. As mentioned earlier, a physician may also seek court
guidance. The focus of a physician in assessing competency in the case of depression or mental
disorder should be evaluating how the patient performs on factors integral to competency. If
those factors are satisfied, the physician should comply with the patient’s wishes.
E. Hospice &Palliative Care
Palliative care is an “interdisciplinary sub-specialty that focuses on relieving suffering
and improving the quality of life for patients with serious illnesses.” 124 Generally, palliative
care is the much preferred alternative to physician-assisted death. Hospice care is “generally
available for people with a life expectancy of 6 months or less who have decided to forgo
curative treatment in favor of comfort care.” 125 Many argue that better pain control should be
offered to every patient regardless of that patient’s medical condition. 126 Nonetheless, hospice
and palliative care have their limits. In fact, an average 83% of patients who decided to ingest
death-hastening drugs in Oregon received hospice care. 127
In the Baxter v. Montana case Justice Nelson notes a response to the state’s argument
that palliative care is a reasonable alternative to physician-assisted death. The response
articulated two stories of individual patients one of which will very briefly be indicated here.
One of the individuals, “despite the conscientious efforts of his personal doctor, hospice
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nurses, and caregivers to provide comfort…endured both physical and emotional pain of
stunning magnitude. His mind was haunted by an acute awareness that his body was
stiffening…becoming immobile. He described a sense of “being ‘stuck’, ‘trapped’,
…’tieddown,’ ‘in prison.’” 128 The individual in question also suffered from severe muscle
spasms, shortness of breath, fear of suffocation, anxiety, panic attacks and claustrophobia. 129 It
is noted that before his death he had been exploring physician-assisted death options but found
no doctor willing to help him. 130 Mr. Baxter, a plaintiff in the case, powerfully stated, “These
stories demonstrate that the State’s ‘palliative care is the answer’ argument has real limitations
and grossly dehumanizing failures.” 131
Palliative care is the ideal. We should be focusing on reducing suffering and giving
support to patients. Even with this noble goal in sight, we must nonetheless keep in mind that
we are not at the stage where everyone is receiving optimal care. Even if we were, we must be
cautious of imposing our moral or practical judgments on others if they seek to end their lives.
In extreme cases, where sedation may be necessary to keep suffering at bay, patients should
have the option of physician-assisted death. We need not—and should not—actively encourage
the exercise of physician-assisted death, but we ought to make it available as an alternative if
the patient so chooses.
F. Disability Discrimination, Autonomy, & the Threshold of Death
The most forceful argument against DWDAs is that they are discriminatory. As it stands,
DWDAs require self-administration of death-hastening drugs. The purpose behind this
requirement is to ensure that death is voluntary. However, it is simply unfair to allow patients
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whose condition prevents them from swallowing pills or from physically self-administering the
drugs to be precluded from access to physician-assisted death, even though they have a terminal
illness and are capable of making health care decisions.132 Two necessary justifications for
allowing physician-death are the previously discussed self-determinative autonomy and Justice
Steven’s ‘threshold of death’. Like love and marriage -- you can’t have one without the other.
Self-determinative autonomy but without the condition of being on the threshold of death would
permit the administering of death-hastening drugs to practically anyone, regardless of their health.
The threshold of death – or an individual’s liberty interest in controlling the last moments of their
life and how they are going to face death, therefore acts as a limiting principle on
self-determinative autonomy. Conversely, a patient on the threshold of death but who lacks
self-determinative autonomy has no interest in choosing how they are to face death, because as
noted from the In re Conroy case, they cannot make a choice. Accordingly, both are prerequisites
to allowing a request for physician-assisted death.
However, a terminally ill person who is incapable of self-administering drugs by virtue of
physical limitations, but who still is able to communicate and make health care decisions, fully
satisfies the requirements of self-determination and being on the threshold of death. By requiring
self-administration of the drugs the bill is therefore discriminatory on its face towards individuals
with certain disabilities or the “wrong diseases.”133For example, ALS (amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis) also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease, slowly causes muscle weakening and eventual
muscle failure.134 A person with such a disease might be unable to use his or her arms or swallow.
Two authors in particular suggest that for those patients who are unable to ingest oral medication,
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that “a mechanism can be introduced by which all that patients are required to do is to activate a
lethal injection administered by a qualified physician.”135 This solves one of our discriminatory
scenarios. But what about a patient who can talk, but not physically self-administer? Perhaps a
mechanism whereby the patient bites to activate a mechanism would be adequate. The New Jersey
bill must change to reflect these kinds of scenarios to avoid being discriminatory against certain
persons with disabilities. Therefore, an amendment to the self-administer clause must be expanded
to allow self-activated intravenous injection, so long as the ultimate act which begins the flow the
death-hastening drugs is caused by the patient him or herself.
There is still yet one more problematic scenario. What about a patient who appears to be
suffering, but has lost the ability to communicate via oral or written means?136 This is a difficult
question without a very good answer. This is in essence a person who is “locked inside” his
non-functional body but whose mind is still capable of rational thought and decision making.
Sadly, such a person would not possess the means to effectuate her self-determinative autonomy.
In a crude sense, as Judge Handler previously suggested, “nature has deprived her of choice.” It
may be suggested that an advanced directive could effectuate the patient’s wishes. But an
advanced directive defeats the requirement that the patient must in some way directly effectuate
the death-hastening drugs. The choice must be in the moment – not years ago. In such an
unfortunate scenario, a guardianship would have to be imposed.
VI. Minor Changes: Family Notification & Death Certificates
The proposed NJ DWDA does not require mandatory notification of family members when
requesting death-hastening drugs. Not requiring notification of next-of-kin family members could
potentially be disastrous and invite after-the-fact lawsuits. Furthermore, notifying family members
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allows concerned relatives to show their support for the patient. Mandatory notification does not in
any way impinge on the patient’s ability to request or receive death-hastening drugs. In fact,
having family present at death seems to be one of the benefits of DWDAs. According to one study,
those receiving death-hastening drug prescriptions felt better prepared for death because they were
able to say their goodbyes to loved ones.137
Another minor change to the proposed DWDA does not concern the patients themselves.
Typically, DWDAs do not require that physician-assisted death or death-hastening drugs be listed
as the cause of death on a patient’s death certificate. For example, in Washington the State
Registrar will reject any death certificate that lists anything other than the terminal illness as the
cause of death in the case of physician-assisted dying.138 Terms such as mercy killing, death with
dignity, physician assisted suicide, suicide, or euthanasia if listed on a certificate will not be
accepted.139 This is simply poor policy. The actual cause of death is indeed the death-hastening
drugs. Listing the underlying terminal illness as the cause of death and not mentioning drugs taken
is disingenuous. A woman diagnosed with terminal cancer who falls to her death has died from
impact, not from the cancer. I propose that the NJ DWD bill be amended to demand that death
certificates list both the underlying terminal illness and the choice to self-administer
death-hastening drugs. The actual killing is done by the drugs. Nonetheless, the underlying illness
should be also listed because of its intimate connection with the choice to self-administer
death-hastening drugs.
VI. Summary of Suggestions & Conclusion
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As we have seen, the New Jersey Death with Dignity bill requires extensive changes.
Among those already mentioned are 1) more careful oversight mechanisms for the distribution and
tracking of death-hastening drugs, 2) physician training in assessing competency for participating
physicians, and 3) alteration of the “self-administer” clause of the bill and allowing for intravenous
self-activated injections. More minor changes proposed are 4) requiring that self-ingested drugs be
listed on the patient’s death certificate in conjunction with the underlying terminal illness, and 5)
requiring notification to families of a pending drug request.
There are genuine situations where a patient should be permitted to request and ingest
death-hastening drugs to facilitate control of the circumstances of her death. Nonetheless, though a
noble goal, its implementation faces hurdles. In discussing end of life care and physician-assisted
death it is best to approach the issues with an open and cautious mind.. New Jersey faces a serious
choice that should not be taken lightly. Given adoption of the aforementioned changes—and
approval by the people of New Jersey—I believe that the New Jersey Death with Dignity Act
could have a positive impact on New Jersey citizens, patients, and families.
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